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Abstract 
 
We combine Eurobarometer surveys with contextual data from 19 countries and three 
decades, and find that elections are increasingly associated with major scandals. In the 
late 1970s few elections were associated with major scandals whereas today 40-50 
percent are. Further, looking at the entire period, both recent and past scandal 
elections have had long-term negative (rather than positive) net effects on satisfaction 
with democracy. However, as scandals have become more common—at different 
rates in different countries—the once negative net effect has withered away. This 
“scandal fatigue syndrome” appears driven both by changes in the composition of 
scandal elections (multi-actor scandal elections still have negative effects but have not 
become more common), as well as by larger heterogeneity in effects (single-actor 
scandal elections used to be inconsequential but gradually assume positive effects as 
scandal elections become more common). The concluding section discusses possible 
interpretations and implications. 
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The unspoken premise of a political scandal is that a contract between citizens and their 
representatives has been violated. Citizens learn that one or more individuals entrusted 
with the right to make collective decisions is publicly accused of morally or legally 
unacceptable actions. If citizens believe the accusation is well-founded they might 
conclude that bad conduct is typical for politics. Scandals are thus potential threats not 
only to besmirched politicians but also to more general trust in representative democracy. 
 
But it is also conceivable that some scandals in some contexts strengthen political trust. 
This would be the case if, perhaps after an initial reaction of anger and frustration, 
citizens conclude that the system as a whole functions well. Individuals might be crossing 
the line but media watchdogs and responsible politicians make sure wrongdoers are 
exposed and dealt with. Alternatively, citizens might sometimes take sides with 
politicians if they see accusations as unfounded, irrelevant, and exaggerated, so that they 
obstruct high-quality election campaigns and public discourse. Yet other scandals may be 
inconsequential for trust. This could happen if expectations on politicians are already 
low, or if citizens have become so accustomed to scandals that more of the same does not 
produce attitude change. 
 
This paper investigates (1) if elections in Western democracies have become increasingly 
associated with scandals, (2) if and how scandal elections stimulate generalizations about 
the functioning of democracy, (3) if the strength and direction of such effects change over 
time as scandal elections have allegedly multiplied, and (4) whether effects are 
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systematically different depending on the number of actors and parties that are 
simultaneously scandalized. 
 
In the next two sections we discuss previous research and hypotheses about what to 
expect in terms of trends in scandal elections and their effects. We then move on to issues 
of definition, measurement and data, and eventually the empirical analysis. The 
concluding section discusses wider interpretations implications of the findings. 
 
Media and the scandalization of politics 
According to Theodore Lowi (1988)  scandals “are corruption revealed.” As discussed 
below we conceptualize the relationship between scandal and corruption somewhat 
differently—not all instances of corruption are potential political scandals, and not all 
scandals are instances of alleged corruption—but he is right in emphasizing the 
importance of publicity for political scandals. This means that the media is a key actor in 
the process (Thompson 2000). 
 
Media researchers have for long observed that the relationship between journalists and 
politicians has changed in past decades. “Medialization” (e.g. Swanson and Mancini 
1996), “New Media Logic” (e.g. Altheide and Snow 1979), and “Media as the Fourth 
Branch of Government” (Cook 1998) are conceptual summaries of developmental trends 
in most, if not all, Western democracies. At the heart of these ideas lies the notion that the 
media has become an independent political actor with an agenda of its own. To their 
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more or less openly expressed dislike, politicians have been forced to adapt to a media-
centered context of communication (e.g. McNair 2000; Meyer 2002). 
 
Also the type of information disseminated to citizens has changed. Journalists are prone 
towards emphasizing strategic and conflictual aspects of politics, to focus on individuals 
rather than on political structures, and to take the position of a watchdog protecting the 
interests of citizens against powerful politicians (e.g. Patterson 1993; Bennett 1996; 
Capella and Jamieson 1997). Moreover, due to increasingly complex news media 
structures, and shortened news cycles, the amount of political information available to 
citizens has multiplied. Recently, new communications technologies have fostered an 
even more personalized and conflictual political coverage (Owen 2000). Of importance 
here is that political scandals fit perfectly into the currently dominating media format 
(Tumber and Waisbord 2004; Johansson 2006). Specifically, the developments in the 
relations between the media and politics lead to the Scandalization-of-elections 
hypothesis. 
 
(H1): Over time, scandals have become more common and prominent themes in 
election campaigns. 
 
Scandals and political trust: past research 
While it seems clear that major scandals can hamper support for involved politicians (De 
Sousa 2001), and at least occasionally parties and governments (but see Maravall 2007; 
Midtbø 2007), the impact of scandals on general political trust is less researched (Bowler 
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and Karp 2004). For sure, many citizens believe politicians are prone towards immoral 
and illegal behaviour (e.g. Klingemann 1999; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Dalton 
2004). What is less clear, however, is the development of scandals as a general 
phenomenon over time, and the extent to which mistrust actually emanates from reported 
behaviour of politicians. 
 
The most closely related large-N comparative evidence comes concerns how citizens in 
different countries react to corruption, a real-world problem underlying some but not all 
political scandals. In particular, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) show that higher levels of 
perceived societal corruption are negatively associated with different forms of political 
trust. Such findings are valuable but by definition only partly relevant for our 
understanding of scandals. Is information about scandal-material such as corruption 
mainly communicated to citizens through everyday experience with the functioning of 
lower level government officials or also through major public election scandals involving 
politicians and high-rank officials such as those under study here? 
 
A few major American scandals have been thoroughly scrutinized. Miller (1999) studied 
the Clinton-Lewinsky affair using cross-sectional data. He concluded that its effects on 
both presidential popularity and general political trust were negligible. The explanations 
included highly partisan perceptions of the scandal, dissatisfaction with exaggerated 
media coverage and biased investigators, as well as a public whose evaluations of leaders 
tend to be multidimensional and differentiated (Owen 2000). Smyth and Taylor’s (2003) 
time-series analysis of monthly popularity data sustain these findings. Analyzing both 
Borttaget:  
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Watergate and Lewinsky, they find scandal effects to be either absent or at least much 
smaller than those of economic performance. 
 
In one of relatively few studies that focus explicitly on general political trust, Bowler and 
Karp (2004) examine the impact of the congressional “House Bank” scandal of the 
1990s. They find that distrust in Congress is associated with knowledge about this 
scandal, and that distrust was greater in districts where congressmen wrote more “bad 
checks.” Moreover, Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000) provide the most complete 
American evidence that at least major scandals can affect general political trust. The 
authors combine quarterly time-series data on trust with information on the timing of 
eight major scandals throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The results suggest congressional 
scandals hamper both trust in congress as well as general trust, whereas presidential 
scandals tend to hurt mainly specific presidential approval. 
 
In the European context, Kepplinger (1996) reports that the German terms “Skandal” and 
“Affäre” became more frequent in the index of Der Spiegel between 1950 and 1989.  In 
the same edited volume, Fridrichsen (1996) studied a series of scandals during 
Germany’s “Superwahljahr” of 1994. Extensive media content analyses revealed nine 
major scandals during this year. These were all rather short-lived in terms of media 
attention but produced short-term spikes in the public’s interest in scandals. However, the 
outbreak of scandals did not contribute to the perception that scandals and political 
mistrust are important problems. There was in a few cases a positive effect of being 
interested in a particular scandal and supporting newer and less established parties, as 
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well as perceiving political mistrust as a societal problem. In a similar vein, Oscarsson 
and Holmberg (2008) measured politically mistrusting Swedes’ subjective explanations 
of their own mistrust. Around 15 percent mentioned scandals and affairs, making this one 
of the more common subjective accounts. 
 
In the French context, an experimental study reports that psychology students who were 
reminded of ex-minister Roland Dumas, and who were already highly knowledgeable 
about the ELF scandal to which he is linked, were less generally trusting in politicians 
than other students (Régner and Lefloch 2005). Likewise, Bowler and Karp (2004) 
analysed the 2001 UK election and find less trust in constituencies with scandalized MPs. 
Similarly, in an essay on corruption in Portugal De Sousa (2001:171, 78) argued that the 
1995 election “showed how corruption can lead to the collapse of a party in power,” and 
reports survey results showing that “Since 1993, when the PSD majority started to be 
rocked by scandals of corruption and financial impropriety, citizens belief in the works of 
democracy declined.” 
 
Studying scandals and their effects 
The  literature review suggests that studies examining scandal effects on political trust 
have usually found a negative impact of some significance. However, the review also 
suggests a number of typical research design features. Taken together, we argue, these 
features call for further investigation. 
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Most obviously, researchers have often relied on a “single-country-few scandals-
approach.” Often only one scandal has been examined. This is hardly a coincidence, but 
rather emblematic of political communication research more generally. While already in 
the 1970s there were calls for more comparative research (Blumler and Gurevitch 1975), 
some argue that they have rarely been heeded (De Vreese 2003; Strömbäck and Aalberg 
2008; van Kempen 2008). 
 
Such studies are valuable as they illuminate ramifications of major historical events. But 
the approach can also be problematic if we wish to understand scandals as a general 
phenomenon. For instance, the design may produce a biased view of scandal effects if 
scholars are likely to focus on single scandals that have already gone down in history, 
while slightly smaller scandals are neglected. Furthermore, concentrating on one scandal 
at the time by definition excludes any effects of accumulations of several scandals, or that 
such accumulations interact with the impact of future scandals. As our theory and data 
will suggest, past scandals can continue to play a role as they enter our “collective 
scandal memory,” as revived by the media and citizens themselves during election 
campaigns. Similarly, the impact of new scandals may be different depending on the 
nature of scandal history. 
 
Further, the single-scandal design often forces researchers to use individual-level 
independent variables, such as respondent’s knowledge about, or perceptions of, a single 
scandal (e.g., Friedrichsen 1996; Miller 1999; Bowler and Karp 2004). Such designs are 
sensitive to chicken-and-egg causality problems. But more than this, they leave out the 
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possibility that scandal effects operate at a more contextual level. From this vantage 
point, trust differences may be found between scandal-ridden and scandal-free contexts, 
just as much as between citizens who are (unequally) exposed to the same scandal-ridden 
context. 
 
Moreover, several past studies have dealt with simultaneous or short-term effects. This is 
true for studies analysing individual-level effects of single scandals using survey data 
(e.g. Miller 1999), for experimental designs (Régner and Lefloch 2005), as well as for 
studies modelling the impact of a somewhat larger number of scandals using time-series 
analysis (e.g. Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Smyth and Taylor 2003) or within-
country geographical variation (e.g. Bowler and Karp 2004). While short-term effects are 
certainly interesting, we focus on more long-term effects, as measured some months after 
elections. Scandal effects on political trust are arguably of (even) greater interest if 
citizens draw more lasting and deeply engrained conclusions. 
 
A final feature of past research is that elections have played a modest role. Scholars have 
usually studied the impact of major scandals whenever they occur in the electoral cycle 
(e.g. Miller 1999; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Smyth and Taylor; but see Bowler 
and Karp 2004). However, whereas the typical between-election scandal is reported as a 
stand-alone event, are results will suggest that election campaigns often allow several old 
and new scandals to (re)surface simultaneously.  This is interesting not least as election 
campaigns tend to boost political interest, and change views of the political system (e.g. 
Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, and Listhaug 2005). There is systematic evidence 
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that elections in Western democracies, when performed according to the standards 
expected by citizens, typically help to build political support among citizens (Ginsberg 
and Weisberg 1978; Finkel 1985, 1987; Holmberg 1999; Esaiasson 2007). From this 
point of view, scandal elections become interesting as they may constitute missed 
opportunities for democracies to legitimize and revitalize themselves. 
 
Hypotheses about the impact of scandal elections on political trust 
We noted previously that scandals may theoretically both erode and build trust. Still, we 
have yet to identify a single publication where researchers report that scandals—through 
adequate system responses to individual misbehavior—have positive effects (see 
Kepplinger 1996, for a similar remark). Instead, most studies report either no or negative 
(short-term) effects. However, we keep an eye out for both possibilities. 
 
(H2a): On balance, scandal elections tend to erode political trust.  
(H2b): On balance, scandal elections tend to strengthen political trust.  
 
In testing H2a and b, we consider the impact of recent scandal elections as well as the 
accumulated number of past scandal elections, assuming that past events can continue to 
be remembered and debated during later campaigns. 
 
But we also consider interactions between scandal history and recent events. Here there 
are two directly conflicting hypotheses, both of which assume that scandals have become 
more commonplace. On the one hand we test the scandal priming hypothesis. As citizens 
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increasingly face scandal-oriented campaigns, they might consider new information along 
the same lines to be extra important. As the name suggests, it draws on priming theory 
(e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987), under which the topics and themes prioritized by the 
mass media weigh heavier in evaluations of actors, issues, and institutions. 
 
On the other hand we have the alternative scandal fatigue hypothesis. It assumes that 
citizens ascribe less importance to scandals as these become more common and cumulate 
over time. This can in turn be the result of two related processes. First, scandal fatigue 
may operate through the composition of scandal material. This is the case if journalists 
must resort to more idiosyncratic and less democratically relevant stories to satisfy their 
growing scandal appetite. Citizens are then increasingly provided with peripheral scandal 
material of a type that did not even matter at the outset. This alone should attenuate 
scandal effects. More than this, however, also effects of comparable contexts and events 
may change. For example, citizens may increasingly question the messenger and 
conclude that journalists are increasingly constructing or exaggerating scandal material. 
Alternatively, citizens may become desensitized to scandals because moral expectations 
of politicians are lowered, or because the marginal informational utility of yet another 
scandal is low (“I already knew they’re crooked”.)  
 
To sum up: 
(H3a): As the number of past scandal elections accumulate over time, the effect of 
yet another scandal election is magnified (the scandal priming hypothesis).  
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(H3b): As the number of past scandal elections accumulate over time, the effect of 
yet another scandal election is attenuated (the scandal fatigue hypothesis). 
 
How homogenous are effects of scandal elections? 
So far we have discussed scandal elections as one broad category, with no consideration 
of the variation within it. However, this paper moves beyond an entirely unitary approach 
and also explores the effects of subcategories of scandals. Scandals, and scandal 
elections, are naturally different from each other along systematic variables. The 
comparative approach employed here allows us to examine this variation. 
 
In principle, this opens up a Pandora’s box of variables about involved actors, subject 
matter, and the legal/political consequences, to mention a few. Our specific contribution 
here, however, is to zoom in on one particular systematic factor that is central to our 
argument about elections. Specifically, we noted that election campaigns are interesting 
as they potentially allow several old and new scandals to (re)surface simultaneously. 
Whenever this happens it should create a more genuine scandal context in which citizens 
can connect otherwise separate events to each other. However, the actual degree of 
generalizability will vary across scandal contexts. As we shall see, some scandal elections 
only concern a single politician, whereas others are defined by multiple scandals, 
politicians, and parties. Hence: 
 
H4: The impact of scandal elections on political trust is magnified when scandal 
elections concern multiple politicians and parties. 
Formaterat:
Teckensnitt:Kursiv
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Measurement and data 
We will combine contextual data on elections and scandals with microlevel 
Eurobarometer surveys. Eurobarometer surveys are biannual opinion polls conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission in all EU member states. Data from the most often 
repeated survey items have been compiled in the “Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file” 
(see Schmitt, Scholz, Leim, and Moschner 2005) which is distributed by The Central 
Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) in Cologne. This data set is by far the most 
encompassing and suitable given our purposes, but it still gives only contains one 
indicator of generalized, national-level, political trust: “On the whole, would you say that 
you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy is functioning in [COUNTRY].” 
 
Critics of this often used survey item point out that its precise meaning is unclear. Does it 
measure overall democratic performance, trust in specific institutions, trust in politicians, 
support for democratic principles, or some mixture of these (Canache, Mondak, and 
Seligson 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003)? Its defenders agree that the meaning is unclear 
but maintain its usefulness as an overall measure of subjective legitimacy and trust 
(Klingemann 1999; Anderson 2002; Blais and Gélineau 2007). Given our interest in 
broad generalizations from specific events, our position is that multiple measures and 
finer distinctions would be desirable but are not absolutely crucial as long as we capture 
much of the broad category of general political trust. 
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The contextual data on scandal elections were drawn from West European Politics and 
Electoral Studies. These academic journals have published election reports since 1977 
and 1982 respectively.  All in all, we coded 153 reported West European parliamentary 
elections in 19 countries between 1977 and 2007.1 West European Politics covered 151 
of these whereas Electoral Studies covered 116. The reports were read and checked for 
the mentioning of scandals defined as: “A sequence of events in which significant public 
attention is focused on alleged illegal, immoral or otherwise inappropriate conduct by 
identifiable politicians or high-rank officials.” 
 
As illustrated by the election scandals listed in appendix B, the definition is inclusive in 
that it captures a broad array of alleged events such as corruption, party/campaign 
finance, private financial misconduct, lying, stealing, drunk-driving, and occasionally 
sex. It is inclusive because our interest is directed towards political scandals as a general 
phenomenon. Given our ambition to move beyond the “one scandal one context,” design 
we believe it is relevant to focus on all types of events that qualify according to a general 
definition. 
 
However, the definition is not all-inclusive with respect to events that may be associated 
with the terms “scandals” and “affairs.” For example, one main type of critical event that 
falls outside our scope of interest is bad policy performance and decision-making. Failure 
to act upon naturally caused disasters such as earth quakes, hurricanes and tsunamis is a 
case in point; mismanagement of the economy regarding regulation of the finance market 
is another. 
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Appendix A provides an overview of the covered elections and registers whether they are 
“scandal elections” judging from the reports. Appendix B contains a list of specific 
scandals with keywords that will give country specialists a feeling for the types of events 
present in the data. 
 
The data can be said to measure two ideal-type election scandals thus defined. First, and 
most obviously, they capture scandals that are initially revealed in close proximity to the 
election. Second, the data frequently allow older scandals to reemerge at election time in 
one way or another, either manifestly on the public/media agenda or as a generally 
suspected causal factor that continue to play a role in opinion formation or political 
communication. In fact, only 22 percent of scandal elections registered in both journals 
exclusively concern scandals that broke during the campaign. 
 
In principle, there are no guarantees that experts are using the same definition as we do. 
However, in practice the reports were usually explicit enough to make it possible to 
determine directly from the text whether the expert mentioned scandals that fitted our 
particular definition. Occasionally however, he/she would make more vague references to 
“a series of scandals” or “affairs.” In such cases, we used additional sources such as 
major newspapers and databases like Wikipedia to determine whether the election 
campaign was associated with scandals fitting our definition. 
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Of course, to some basic extent all election campaigns are associated with scandals. It is 
simply unlikely that the media and the main contenders do not touch on at least some 
alleged misbehavior at some point. The scandals we expect the reports to capture, 
however, should be more significant than those minor scandal distractions that invariably 
surface around election time. After all, the reports are written by professional 
scholars/political scientists with an analytic/historical focus and a limited number of 
pages at their disposal.  
 
We used two strategies to gauge the validity of the independent scandal variables. First, 
we compared the classification of elections (scandal or not) resulting from reports in the 
two journals respectively. There is strong but not absolute agreement between the two: 86 
percent of the 114 elections with two reports were classified in the same way. When 
analyzing the impact of scandal elections on satisfaction with democracy we will 
generally use an independent variable coded 1 if both journals mention scandals and 0 for 
all other cases. 
  
A second strategy involved comparing our list of election scandals with the scandals 
discussed in three book-long publications on scandals.2 These sources allowed us to 
construct an independent list of major political scandals for about half of the countries in 
our sample for at least part of the thirty years covered. We find that all scandals 
mentioned in election reports were discussed in at least one the sources, indicating that 
reports tend to mention scandals of some relevance and magnitude. 
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The rise of scandals elections 
More often than not over the time period covered, Europeans have chosen their 
representatives without being primed about the major scandals that make their way into 
expert analyses of elections.3 At least one scandal is mentioned in at least one journal in 
39 percent of the 153 parliamentary elections for which we have at least one expert 
report. When we apply the more demanding criterion that there shall be two expert 
reports and that both shall mention scandals, the corresponding figure is 30 percent 
(n=114). 
 
To test H1, Figure 1 reports the proportion of scandal elections—as measured by at least 
one expert discussing scandals—by six time periods. The results clearly support the 
hypothesis. In the beginning of the time period, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
elections were rarely associated with scandals. More recently, roughly between 40 and 50 
percent are.5 
 
[FIGURE 1: ABOUT HERE] 
 
Specifically, the data indicate a continuing increase up until the late 1990s, with a major 
shift taking place in the late 1980s. The current time period is the first for which the 
proportion of scandal elections is lower than in the preceding period. Although there is a 
statistically significant trend in the data (btime period=.06; SE=.028; p<.05), pairwise 
comparisons of the time periods show that most later differences are statistically 
insignificant (difference of proportion tests). The cautious conclusion is that European 
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election campaigns changed fundamentally in the mid-1980s, and that following 
variations are more random. 
 
The rise of scandal elections is not driven by particular countries. Figure 2 shows that the 
basic pattern of an increase in scandal elections from the early period to the late period is 
found in 15 of 19 countries. Only Austria, Denmark, Finland and Italy experienced a 
different type of development in which scandals were a more common theme in the 
campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Austria and Italy the level of scandalous 
campaigns was high in the early period, whereas in Denmark and Finland scandal 
elections have been relatively uncommon during both periods.  
 
[FIGURE 2: ABOUT HERE] 
 
Scandal elections and satisfaction with democracy 
Table 1 displays estimates of multilevel models with three hierarchically ordered levels: 
individuals in post-election contexts in countries. The dependent variable is the individual 
respondent’s satisfaction with democracy as measured usually one Eurobarometer wave 
after the elections.6 The lag is introduced as we seek to assess the medium/long-term 
impact of scandals, as opposed to the short-term or simultaneous effects that have been 
the target of most previous studies. The dependent variable varies between 1 and 4, with 
higher values indicating greater satisfaction.7 
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Model 1 is an “empty” variance components model that lacks a fixed part containing 
independent variables. Instead, it only estimates a universal intercept together with one 
random error term for each of the three levels (i=individuals, j=post-election contexts, 
k=countries).8 
 
Model 1: Satdemijk = α  + eijk +  ujk + vk 
 
Model 1 is interesting as the relative size of the variances of the error terms hint at the 
hierarchical causal origins of satisfaction with democracy. Of course, a precondition for 
pursuing contextual scandal effects is variation at this particular level. The estimates for 
Model 1 reveal significant variation at all three levels of analysis. Characteristically for 
survey data, some 67 percent of the overall variation can be attributed to individual-level 
factors (SD=.800). Still, there are significant and non-trivial levels of variation across 
countries (18 percent; SD; .210) as well as across election contexts (15 percent; 
SD=.180). This suggests that a “flat” single-level OLS approach could well give biased 
coefficients and standard errors (Hox 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
 
[TABLE 1:ABOUT HERE] 
 
To test H2a and H2b, Model 2 adds independent variables. One registers whether the 
recent election is associated with scandals. It takes on the value 0 of no journal mentions 
a scandal and 1 if both journals do.9 In accordance with our reasoning in the previous 
section, another registers cumulatively the number of scandal elections have occurred in 
this country prior to the election in question. 
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Omitted variable bias is a concern as these data are non-experimental. Selecting control 
variables, however, is difficult precisely because there has been little comparative 
research on scandal effects. Thus, there is little specific theory or evidence about when 
and where scandals elections occur, and whether such factors are related to the dependent 
variable. Further, only a few of the many individual-level variables that have been 
discussed in research on political trust are actually available in the data over a sufficient 
timespan.10 Similarly, that we only have 15 countries severely limits the number of 
country-level variables that can be simultaneously modelled (Hox 2002). 
 
Rather than estimating a “fully” specified model, then, model 2 controls for a smaller 
number of variables at different levels, all of which are known to affect satisfaction with 
democracy.11 In several cases, moreover, it is plausible to assume that these also correlate 
with the probability of scandal elections. More precisely, we control for age, gender and 
life satisfaction (individual level); year of election and level of unemployment (election 
level); and proportional versus (partly) non-proportional electoral system (national 
level).12 
 
Model 2:  Satdemijk = α  + β1Scandal electionjk 
+ β2Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk  
+ Country level controlsk + Election level controlsjk + Individual level controlsijk 
+ eijk +  ujk +  vk 
 
As evidenced by a statistically significant coefficient, there is a negative main effect of 
scandal election on satisfaction with democracy taking control variables into account 
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(β1=-.16). In support of H2a, then, recent scandal elections on balance seem to have 
eroded political trust. This effect, however, only amounts to about one-fifth of the 
standard deviation at level 1 (.800).  Also, the election context variation only drops from 
.180 in Model 1 to .173 in Model 2. All this indicates that recent scandal elections have 
played a certain but modest role in explaining variation in satisfaction with democracy 
across election contexts. Moreover, there is no sign here that satisfaction with democracy 
is affected by the accumulated number of past elections. 
 
Model 3 tests the scandal priming hypothesis (H3a) and the rival scandal fatigue 
hypothesis (H3b). It shows what has happened to the effect of a recent scandal election as 
the historical baggage of past scandal elections has become heavier over time. The 
interaction coefficient β3 now registers whether the impact of a scandal election has 
decreased, increased, or stayed the same as the accumulated number of past scandal 
elections has grown. 
 
 
Model 3:  Satdemijk = α  + β1Scandal electionjk 
+ β2Cumulative number of scandal electionsjk 
+ β 3Scandal electionjk x  Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk 
+ Country level controlsk + Election level controlsjk + Individual level controlsijk 
+ eijk +  ujk + vk 
 
The effect (β1) of a new scandal election has now increased to -.25. As this equals roughly 
one standard deviation across countries and elections, and about one-third of the standard 
deviation across individuals, the effect is more substantial than in Model 1. It is crucial to 
note, however, that this coefficient taps the effect in the early situation before the 
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scandalization of elections phenomenon emerged. In more recent situations, the 
interaction coefficient suggests, the impact of a scandal election will be smaller (β3=.09). 
Specifically, the impact of scandal elections is predicted to have withered away 
completely by the time a country reaches an accumulation of 2-3 scandal elections as 
reported in both journals.  
 
This latter finding is inconsistent with the scandal priming hypothesis (H3a) predicting 
that scandals will become more consequential as they become more common. Rather, it is 
wholly consistent with the scandal-fatigue-hypothesis predicting that citizens react less to 
the scandal components of elections (H3b). Moreover, the inclusion of an interaction 
term allows us to discover that also cumulative election history exercises a negative 
effect, though apparently only when the recent election was not scandalized (Β2= -.09). 
Scandal history thus appears to matter when there are no major recent events. 
 
1Finally, the control variables help putting scandal effects into perspective. A comparison 
with life dissatisfaction reveals it would take about four recent or eleven past scandal 
elections to match differences between really happy/unhappy individuals. A comparison 
with unemployment rate is more flattering for the scandal effect. A recent scandal 
election is about as destructive for democratic satisfaction as another 10-15 percent of 
unemployment (assuming no threshold effects). Furthermore, whenever the recent 
election was not scandalized, one long-gone scandal election is about as bad news as 
another 5 percent losing their jobs. 
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Scandal heterogeneity? 
In this section we relax the implicit scandal homogeneity assumption made in previous 
analyses. According to H4, the generalization from specific events to general mistrust 
will be smoother when more politicians, especially from different parties, are accused of 
wrongdoings. To test this, we created dummy variables separating scandal elections 
involving (1) more than one politician from a scandalized party (multipolitician scandal 
election), (2) politicians from two or more parties (multiparty scandal election), and (3) 
scandal elections involving one individual only (single politician scandal election). 
Looking at the entire period, 42 percent of all scandal elections are multipolitician, 22 
percent multiparty, and the remaining 36 percent are single politician. Table 2 displays 
their effects together with interactions with accumulated scandal history. 
 
Model 4 in Table 2 adds an important finding. Apparently only multiparty scandal 
elections have had significant negative net effects on satisfaction with democracy (-.40). 
Interestingly, its effects remain the same over time as indicated by the wholly 
insignificant interaction with accumulated scandal history. Citizens thus appear as 
sensitive to multiparty scandal elections after the scandalization of elections as before.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In contrast, multipolitician scandal elections have no discernable effect and neither does 
the interaction with cumulative experience. Single politician scandal elections, too, have 
insignificant effects looking at the entire period (-.04).  Interestingly however, its 
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interaction with cumulative scandal experience is significantly positive (.22). So whereas 
single politician scandals, perhaps quite intuitively, did not matter much initially they 
gradually take on positive effects as scandal experiences pile up. 
 
Overall, these results offer two additions to the story. First, not even major scandal 
elections that qualify for our overall criteria are created equal with respect to their impact 
on trust. Only multiparty scandal contexts, which should stimulate generalization, have 
exercised systematic net negative effects. A second addition concerns the nature of 
“scandal fatigue,” which comes out as both a compositional as well as a contextual 
process. It is compositional as it turns out that the consistently most influential scandal 
election type (multiparty) has not become more common; the correlation between time 
and percentage of multiparty scandal contexts is only very mildly positive (r=.04; n=114). 
An equally flat line is found for multi politician contexts (r=.04; n=114). In contrast, 
there has been a clear increase in single politician scandal contexts (r=.23; n=114 
elections). 
 
Scandal fatigue, however, also seems to be a more genuinely contextual phenomenon, in 
the sense that effects of comparable events also change as a result of overall 
scandalization. Specifically, single-politician scandal elections used to be inconsequential 
but have assumed positive net effects as scandal elections have become more common. 
Possible interpretations and implications of this and other findings will be the topics of 
the concluding section.  
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Conclusions 
In support of H1, scandal elections as measured here were uncommon in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. More recently, close to half of the parliamentary elections in Western 
Europe are associated with at least one scandal that scholars find worth mentioning in 
professional election analyses. 
 
Looking across the entire period, furthermore, scandal elections have had negative net 
effects on political trust. Recent scandal elections have mattered the most, but the number 
of past scandal elections also play a role in the absence of recent events. These negative 
net effects support H2a, rather than H2b, and fit with several past studies. Still, scandals 
variables only explain a small part of the variation in satisfaction with democracy. 
Moreover, effects are clearly smaller than that of individual level life dissatisfaction, and 
instead comparable with the more moderate impact of unemployment levels. 
 
Negative net effects, furthermore, seem to have been typical mainly for an earlier 
historical epoch. Consistent with the “scandal fatigue” hypothesis (H3b), we find an 
interaction between the impact of a recent scandal election and the accumulated number 
of past scandal elections in the country. During the early period when major scandal 
elections were still rare exceptions, scandal elections had more sizable negative 
ramifications. However, as scandals have accumulated—at different rates in different 
countries—the net effect has shrunk. It is predicted to have vanished by the time a 
country reaches an accumulation of 2-3 major scandal elections. 
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For sure, this does not mean scandal effects will disappear overnight. Major scandal 
elections continue to matter in the future as they enter the accumulated scandal history 
that tends to be revived at election time. Thus, while current-day scandal elections may 
now be less clearly consequential in the negative direction, citizens continue to be 
negatively affected by events that once were. Ultimately however, also the historical 
baggage will transform and increasingly consist of events that were not even 
consequential when they first surfaced.  
 
The test of H4 confirmed that election contexts matter more where several politicians 
from several  parties are scandalized. In fact, the negative net impact over the entire 
period appears mainly driven by this subset of scandal elections. Single party or single 
politician contexts do not appear to ever have mattered much in the negative direction. 
Additionally, the examination of H4 throws light on the nature of the scandal fatigue 
syndrome. First, the composition of scandal elections has changed in at least one 
important way: multiparty scandal elections matter negatively throughout the period but 
have not become more common. Most of the general scandalization instead is due to an 
increase in single politican scandal elections. Thus, scandalization appears to have spread 
itself thin across elections. Second, we find larger heterogeneity in the direction of effects 
as scandal elections become more common. In particular, single-actor scandal elections 
used to be inconsequential but gradually assume positive effects. To our knowledge this 
is the first comparative evidence that at least one significant subgroup of scandals can 
exercise positive effects on political trust. 
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Providing a fuller explanation for the increasingly heterogeneous and partly positive 
effects will be a challenge for future research. One possible explanation is that citizens 
are (increasingly) happy to see the political system sanitize itself from “bad apples.” 
Single-politician scandal elections may matter in the positive direction because they 
might be more likely to provide that sanitation, whereas multi-actor contexts may 
increase the odds that at least some perceived villain gets away with it.  
 
However, the uncovered patterns could also be more directly consistent with a refined 
version of the scandal fatigue story. Under this modified interpretation, citizens are tired 
of, and desensitized to, scandals. But they may still be persuaded of their relevance if it 
seems likely that several individuals from several parties are scandalized. By contrast, in 
the increasingly common single-politician scandal election contexts they may question 
the media messengers. From this vantage point, then, citizens are increasingly quick 
recognize that some of the steep increase in scandal coverage is as driven by media logic 
and journalist ambition as by real-world problems worthy of such massive attention. 
From this perspective, positive effects of single-politician scandal elections on the 
(notoriously unclear) satisfaction with democracy indicator might signify sympathy for 
popular but scandalized politicians and support for a democracy under attack by 
overaggressive media. 
 
There are some scattered and anecdotal observations to support this latter interpretation. 
Miller (1999:724) observed in the Clinton-Lewinsky aftermath that “One frequently got 
the impression that the journalists were all Woodward and Bernstein wannabees, but that 
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they did not want to put any effort into checking out their sources […] Moreover, news 
media were constantly filled with stories about the scandal even though the public 
overwhelmingly reported that the affair was receiving too much coverage.” One might 
add here that there is little systematic evidence to show that the moral standards of West 
European politicians have actually deteriorated. In a study of state administrative 
capacity, which is strongly determined by levels of corruption, Bäck and Hadenius (2008) 
report only a slightly negative curve during the period 1985-2000. Thus, citizens are 
faced with increasing single-politician scandal coverage at the same time as their 
societies are largely as (non)corrupt as before. Perhaps citizens are asking themselves 
whether the scandalization of electoral politics is really warranted. Politicians certainly 
do. By example, when Swedish MPs were surveyed about the causes of declining trust 
among citizens “scandals involving politicians” were ranked at the bottom of a list of 
factors, whereas “media coverage of politics” was ranked as the clearly most important 
reason (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996:120-2). 
 
In conclusion, scandals have become the bread-and-butter of electoral politics. But the 
butter seems to have been spread thin. Perhaps for this reason scandal elections—as a 
general phenomenon—have become largely inconsequential for citizens’ satisfaction 
with representative democracy. 
 
 
 
  30
 
07
    X
 
Y
     X
          
06
 
(Y
)          0   X
    X
  
05
   0   0 0        0 X
    
04
        X
    -     0   
03
  X
  0     -    (0
) 0     0 
02
 
0    (0
) X
    Y
    0  (0
)  X
  
01
   0    0    0    Y
     
00
        (0
)         X
   
99
 
(Y
) 
X
  0     0   (0
)    0   Y
 
98
   X
   (0
)       (0
) 0    X
  
97
     
(Y
)  X
   
(Y
)     
(Y
)     
96
        (0
)   Y
  (0
)    X
   
95
 
0 X
  0     Y
       X
   0 
94
 
X
  X
   
(Y
)     X
 0  0    0  
93
     X
   X
       0  X
   
92
       0   Y
 
X
  (0
)       
91
  0  0     0       Y
  0 (Y
) 
90
 
X
  0   0  (0
)            
89
        X
*   0  Y
  (0
) 0  0   
88
   (0
)  Y
             X
  
87
  0 0 0  Y
 
X
  X
 0 0  0   0   Y
 
86
 
X
    Y
         Y
   (0
)   
85
  0      0       0 0  0  
84
   Y
         0        
83
 
X
   X
  0 0  (0
)  X
     0   (0
) 
82
          Y
#    0   0 0  
81
  0 0  0   0  0   (0
) 
(0
) 0     
80
      0          (Y
)    
79
 
(Y
)  (0
) 
(0
)   (0
)  (0
)  - (0
)    0  (0
) 
(0
) 
78
  (0
)   0    (0
)        -   
77
  - -     (0
)  -    - (0
)  -   
  A
us
tri
a 
B
el
gi
um
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 
G
er
m
an
y 
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n 
G
re
ec
e 
Ic
el
an
d 
Ir
el
an
d 
Ita
ly
 
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g 
M
al
ta
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
N
or
w
ay
 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Sp
ai
n 
Sw
ed
en
 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
 
Le
ge
nd
: 0
: N
o 
sc
an
da
l r
ep
or
te
d 
fo
r e
le
ct
io
n 
co
nt
ex
t; 
Y
: S
ca
nd
al
 re
po
rte
d 
fo
r e
le
ct
io
n 
co
nt
ex
t i
n 
on
e 
jo
ur
na
l; 
X
: S
ca
nd
al
 re
po
rte
d 
fo
r e
le
ct
io
n 
co
nt
ex
t i
n 
tw
o 
jo
ur
na
ls
.; 
( )
 O
nl
y 
on
e 
el
ec
tio
n 
 re
po
rt 
av
ai
la
bl
e;
 ; 
- N
o 
el
ec
tio
n 
re
po
rt 
av
ai
la
bl
e;
 #  
 Ir
el
an
d 
he
ld
 tw
o 
el
ec
tio
ns
 in
 1
98
2,
 th
e 
co
di
ng
 Y
 
re
fe
rs
 to
 th
e 
 N
ov
em
be
r e
le
ct
io
n;
*  G
re
ec
e 
he
ld
 tw
o 
el
ec
tio
ns
 in
 1
98
9,
 b
ot
h 
of
 th
em
 a
re
 c
od
ed
 X
. 
C
om
m
en
t: 
El
ec
to
ra
l S
tu
di
es
 d
oe
s n
ot
 c
ov
er
 e
le
ct
io
n 
co
nt
ex
ts
 b
ef
or
e 
19
80
 (w
ith
 th
e 
ex
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 F
ra
nc
e 
19
78
 a
nd
 P
or
tu
ga
l 1
97
9)
.  
Appendix A. Covered parliamentary elections 
in 19 Western Democracies 1977-2007 
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Appendix B: List of Election Scandals 1977-2007 
Country 
Election 
context Description Journals 
Austria 1979 The Androsch affair (financial misconduct) WEP only 
 1983 Scandals related to construction works WEP/ES 
 1986 The Reder Affair (WWII war criminal 
personally welcomed to Austria by the defence 
minister) 
WEP/ES 
  The Androsch affair WEP/ES 
  The Sekanina affair (financial misconduct) WEP/ES 
  The Waldheim controversy  WEP/ES 
 1990 Scandals in the SPÖ WEP/ES 
 1994 Corruption in the socialist party WEP/ES 
 1999 The Rosenstingl affair (stealing MP) WEP only 
 2006 The BAWAG scandal (financial misconduct) ES only 
Belgium 1995 The Augusta affair  WEP/ES 
 1999 The Augusta affair WEP/ES 
 2003 The Antwerp city administration affair 
(financial misconduct) 
WEP/ES 
Denmark 1984 The Mogens Glistrup affair (financial 
misconduct) 
ES 
 1994 The Poul Schlüter affair (misconduct) WEP/ES 
 1998 The Hans Engell affair (drunk driving) WEP/ES 
Finland 1983 Malpractice among politicians WEP/ES 
 2007 “Iraqgate” (misuse of secret documents) WEP/ES 
France 1986 The Rainbow Warrior affair  ES 
 1988 Luchaire affair WEP 
 1988 The Carrefour du developpement affair 
(financial misconduct) 
WEP 
 1993 The Pechiney affair (insider trading) WEP/ES 
 1993 The Urba-Technic affair (campaign finance 
misconduct) 
WEP 
  The “contaminated blood” affair (unnecessary 
delays in HIV-testing) 
WEP 
 1997 Toubon, Longuet and Thoma scandals WEP only 
 2007 The Alain Juppe affair (financial misconduct) WEP 
1987 The Flick affair (corruption) WEP Germany 
(West) 1987 The Neue Heimat affair (financial misconduct) WEP 
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Germany 1994 Corruption scandals in the CSU WEP only 
 2002 The Kohl affair (financial misconduct) WEP/ES 
  Refuse incineration affair (corruption) WEP 
  The Scharping affair (financial misconduct) WEP 
Great 
Britain 
1987 The Westland affair (controversies related to 
helicopter manufacturer) 
WEP/ES 
 1997 The Scott investigation (government sales of 
weapons) 
WEP 
  The “Cash for questions” affair (corruption) WEP 
  Sex scandals among MP:s WEP/ES 
Greece 1989a Papandreou scandals  WEP/ES 
 1989b The Koskotas affair (corruption) WEP/ES 
 1993 The Mitsotakis affair (corruption) WEP/ES 
 2004 Corruption WEP/ES 
  The Porto Carras scandal WEP 
Ireland 1982b  
 
Government scandals (including the handling of 
a murder in the defence minister’s apartment) 
WEP 
 1992 Corrupt dealings between the meat industry and 
the government 
WEP 
 1997 The “Mercs and perks” affair (abuse of 
government cars)  
WEP only 
 2002 Government scandals ES 
 2007 The Ahern affair (financial misconduct) WEP/ES 
Iceland 1987 The Gudmundson affair (tax freud) WEP/ES 
 1995 Scandal in the Social Democrat party ES 
Italy 1983 The petrol scandal ES 
  Corruption in the PSI WEP/ES 
  The Ambrosiano bank affair and Calvi mystery 
(the murder or suicide of the chairman of the 
Ambrosiano bank and loss of a large sum of 
money) 
ES 
  The Camorra affair (ties between the mob and 
political parties) 
ES 
 1992 Corruption in the socialist party, ties between 
Christian Democrats and the mob 
WEP/ES 
 1994 Operation Clean Hands WEP/ES 
 1996 The Cesare Previti affair (bribery) ES 
Luxembourg 1989 The Mondorf affair (financial misconduct) ES 
Netherlands 1986 The RSV of Rotterdam affair (improper 
government grants) 
WEP 
 2006 The Ayaan Hirsi Ali affair (lying MP) WEP/ES 
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Norway 1997 Planning minister scandal (financial 
misconduct) 
WEP only 
 2001 Deputy leader sex scandal WEP 
  The Bastesen affair (politician had indirect 
investments in a pornography channel) 
WEP 
Portugal 1980 The Sá Carneiro affair (financial misconduct) WEP 
 1991 Several scandals (one involving the minister of 
finance) 
ES 
 1995 Government scandals (corruption) WEP/ES 
 2005 Government scandals, illegal building 
permissions   
WEP/ES 
Spain 1993 The Filesa case (corruption in the PSOE) WEP/ES 
  The Guerra affair (financial misconduct) WEP 
 1996 Government corruption WEP/ES 
  The GAL affair (illegal death squad) WEP/ES 
 2000 The José Borrel Affair (corruption) WEP/ES 
Sweden 1988 The Ebbe Carlsson affair (illegal private 
investigation of the assassination of Olof 
Palme) 
WEP/ES 
 1998 The Mona Sahlin affair (abuse of credit cards) WEP/ES 
 2002 The campaign booth report affair (improper 
statements by politicians) 
WEP/ES 
 2006 The spy scandal (campaign espionage) WEP/ES 
Switzerland 1987 Corruption in the People’s party WEP 
 1991 The Kopp affair (discovery of secret files) WEP only 
 1999 The Bellasi scandal (financial misconduct and 
smuggling of arms to criminal organizations by 
the intelligence service) 
WEP 
 
Legend: “WEP/ES”: Scandal reported in both journals. “WEP”: Scandal reported in West 
European politics but not in Electoral Studies. “ES”: Scandal reported in Electoral studies 
but not in West Europan politics. “WEP only”: Scandal reported in West European 
Politics, election context not covered by Electoral Studies. “ES only”: Scandal reported in 
Electoral Studies, election context not covered by West European Politics. 
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Table 1. Multilevel models of scandal election effects on satisfaction with democracy (three levels; ML estimation) 
  
Model 1: 
Variance 
components model 
 
 
Model 2: 
Main effects 
model 
 
Model 3: 
Interactive 
model 
 
FIXED PART:    
Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk   -. 05 -.09** 
Scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals)  -.16*** -.25*** 
Scandal electionjk x Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk   .09* 
 
Controls: 
   
Ageijk   .0003* .0002* 
Womanijk  -.03*** -.03*** 
Life dissatisfactionijk (1 – 4)  -.32*** -.32*** 
Unemployment leveljk  -.02** -.02** 
Yearjk (0=1980)  .01* .01** 
Fully proportional electoral systemk  .21*** .18** 
    
    
RANDOM PART:    
Individual level: Standard deviation of eijk .800*** .791*** .765*** 
Election level: Standard deviation of ujk .180*** .173*** .138*** 
Country level: Standard deviation of vk .210*** .206*** .108*** 
No. of countries 15 15 15 
No. of elections 55 55 55 
No. of individuals 59,448 59,448 59,448 
  
-2LogLikelihood 
 
142348.8 
 
137057.0 
 
137053.4 
*p<.10  ** p<.05   *** p<.01 
Notes: Unweighted data from The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. Parliamentary elections. The models also contain intercepts, the estimates of which are not displayed here. 
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Table 2. Multilevel models of types of scandal elections and satisfaction with democracy (three levels; ML estimation) 
  
Model 4: 
 
Main 
effects 
 
 
Model 5: 
 
Interactions 
FIXED PART:   
Single-politician scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals) .06 -.04 
Multi-politician scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals) -.03 .01 
Multi-party scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals) -.36*** -.40*** 
   
Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk  -.06** -.07** 
   
Single-politician  scandal electionjk x Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk  .22** 
Multi-party scandal electionjk x Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk  .05 
Multi-politician scandal electionjk x Cumulative number of past scandal electionsjk  -.03 
   
RANDOM PART:   
Individual level: Standard deviation of eijk .765*** .765*** 
Election level: Standard deviation of ujk .141*** .133*** 
Country level: Standard deviation of vk .064*** .053* 
No. of countries 15 15 
No. of elections 55 55 
No. of individuals 59,448 59,448 
  
-2LogLikelihood 
 
137046.7 
 
137039.6 
*p<.10  ** p<.05   *** p<.01 
Notes: Unweighted data from The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. Parliamentary elections. The models also contain intercepts, as well as the same control variables as does 
Table 1, the estimates of which are not displayed here. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
1 More exactly, the study covers elections with reports published at the latest in 2007. 
Elections reported later are not included. 
2 These were: “Political Scandals and Causes Celebres since 1945. An International 
Reference Compendium. (1991),” “Political Scandals and Media Across Democracies 
Volume I and II” (two special issues of American Behavioral Scientist, see Tumber and 
Waisbord 2004), and “Scandals in Past and Contemporary Politics” (edited by Garrard 
and Newell 2006 ). 
3 The scandal election rate was 34 percent for West European Politics (N=151) and 36 
percent for Electoral Studies (N=116).  
5 As indicated in the section on data and measurement, we find equally clear support for 
H1 also when journals are considered separately, and when the criterion are changed to 
an election having to be associated with scandals in both journals. For the sake of 
parsimony, and to extend the test over a longer period of time, we report only Figure 1 
(scandal in at least one journal). 
6 Satisfaction with democracy was not included in all Eurobarometer surveys. However, 
86 percent of respondents included in Table 1 were surveyed in the Eurobarometer that 
followed immediately in the subsequent half-year. None were surveyed later than in the 
fourth post-election Eurobarometer. Analyses show that effects of scandal elections are 
not weaker among those few respondents that were surveyed later than in the subsequent 
half-year. 
7 The empirical window provided by Table 1 is smaller than previous analyses both in 
terms of space and time. As for space, it is necessarily restricted to the 15 EU countries 
Borttaget: 
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that have been surveyed with some regularity by the Eurobarometer. As for time, it 
covers only elections until spring 2001 because satisfaction with democracy is included 
for the last time in the autumn the same year. Finally, the time period starts in 1981 as the 
analysis draws on information provided by both journals. 
8 Multilevel modes were estimated using STATA’s xtmixed command 
9 Results which are not shown in detail here suggest an overall measure of chronological 
time would be less than optimal when testing for scandal priming and fatigue. First, and 
most importantly, countries have gone through different numbers of scandal elections. 
Some countries – Austria, Greece, Italy, and Sweden – are registered for about 4 or more 
experiences whereas others Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, and the Netherlands have had 
very few. Secondly, the timing of scandalization varies considerably. In some countries, 
it has emerged gradually over the years, whereas other countries have experienced more 
intense and recent increases (i.e. Belgium). 
10 Three variables emphasized by the political trust literature—general media use, 
postmaterialist values, macroeconomic perceptions, and general media use—are available 
but only for certain periods. We decided against using them as their inclusion would 
severely shorten the time frame, reduce the number of countries, and generally result in a 
data loss of one-third (postmaterialism), close to half (media use), or more than half 
(economic evaluations). It should be noted, however, that some of the variation in 
postmaterialism and economic evaluations is picked up by the joint inclusion of age, year, 
and unemployment controls. Moreover, we decided against controlling for political 
orientations that are conceptually close to satisfaction with democracy such as the 
strength of party attachment. Such orientations may constitute legitimate causal parths for 
Formaterat: Normal,
Radavstånd:  dubbelt
Formaterat: Engelska
(Storbritannien)
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scandal election effects. While such mechanisms are interesting in themselves this paper 
is mainly concerned with the extent of, and explanations for, “total” scandal election 
effects. 
11 Year is needed to discover that also cumulative election history seems to matter. Its 
negative coefficient is initially masked by a positive time trend in the data. The trend is 
partly due to the fact that high-satisfaction countries such as Sweden, Finland, and 
Austria became EU (barometer) members at a later stage and that low-satisfaction 
countries such as Italy and Belgium were already in the data to begin with. While this 
“trend” is not very substantively interesting one needs to control for it in order to discover 
the moderately negative effect of number of past scandal elections. 
12 We have also performed additional tests additional performance indicators (election 
level) such as GDP growth. However, this is not shown in the table as growth is 
insignificant controlling for unemployment and life satisfaction. The macro data used for 
Model 4 were taken from the Quality of Government Institute’s Social Policy Data Set 
(Samanni, Teorell, Kumlin, and Rothstein 2008). In turn, this data set draws annual 
unemployment levels from OECD data as taken from the “Comparative Political Data Set 
1960-2006” (Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, and Beyeler 2008), and growth levels 
from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) and “Penn World Table” (Heston, Summers, 
and Aten 2002). For electoral systems, we used information from Golder (2005). 
 
 
Borttaget: ¶
The two first control variables are 
age and gender. Throughout the 
period, older respondents are at 
any given point in time more 
likely to be satisfied, perhaps out 
of more respect for authorities and 
less self-expressive participatory 
individualism (Inglehart 1999). 
Likewise, women tend to be less 
satisfied with democracy, 
reasonably because of their 
chronic subordination in society 
and politics.¶
¶
Furthermore, the model controls 
for life dissatisfaction, where 
personal unhappiness is strongly 
associated with less democratic 
satisfaction (-.32). This is an 
important control variable because 
scandals may be more frequently 
covered, dwelled-upon, and 
exaggerated where there is much 
general dissatisfaction. Poor 
political performance may give 
highly negative, mocking or 
disrespectful information about 
politicians a boost as popular 
campaign themes. If so, the 
bivariate scandal effect may be a 
compositional mirage due to the 
fact that scandals rise to 
prominence where there are many 
dissatisfied individuals. A similar 
rationale underpins the contextual 
unemployment level control; 
perhaps scandals figure as major 
political themes more often where 
the polit
Sid. 19: [1] Borttaget stakum 6/17/2009 2:11:00 PM 
 that an overall measure of chronological time would be less than optimal when testing for scandal priming and fatigue. First, and most 
importantly, countries have gone through different numbers of scandal elections. Some countries – Austria, Greece, Italy, and Sweden 
– are registered for about 4 or more experiences whereas others Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, and the Netherlands have had very few. 
Secondly, the timing of scandalization varies considerably. In some countries, it has emerged gradually over the years, whereas other 
countries have experienced more intense and recent increases. Thus, in conclusion, the scandalization of elections is best described as 
a common theme with variations. 
 
Sid. 23: [2] Borttaget Valued Acer Customer 6/19/2009 10:16:00 AM 
As these data are non-experimental one naturally wonders if results change when control variables are added. Selecting control 
variables, however, is difficult precisely because there has been little comparative research on political scandals. Thus, there is little 
specific theory or evidence to draw on when thinking about the contextual circumstances under which scandals are more or less likely 
to attract attention, and whether any such factors are also related to the dependent variable. Further, only a few of the many individual-
level variables that have been discussed in research on political trust are actually available in the data over a sufficient timespan. 
 
Sid. 23: [3] Borttaget Valued Acer Customer 6/19/2009 10:16:00 AM 
1 Similarly, that we only have 15 countries severely limits the number of country-level variables that can be simultaneously  
 
Sid. 23: [4] Borttaget Valued Acer Customer 6/19/2009 10:16:00 AM 
modelled (Hox 2002). 
 Rather than estimating a “fully” specified model, then, model 4 controlss for a smaller number of chosen variables at different levels, 
all of which affect satisfaction with democracy. In several cases, moreover, it is plausible to assume that these also correlate with the 
probability of scandal electionMore preciselys. versusInterestingly, while the control variables themselves affect satisfaction with 
democracy, their inclusion marginally strengthens the evidence for scandal election effects. While the cross-level interaction remains 
the same the recent scandal election coefficient is slightly boosted. The coefficient for the cumulative number of past scandal elections 
grows to statistical significance. 
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The two first control variables are age and gender. Throughout the period, older respondents are at any given point in time more likely 
to be satisfied, perhaps out of more respect for authorities and less self-expressive participatory individualism (Inglehart 1999). 
Likewise, women tend to be less satisfied with democracy, reasonably because of their chronic subordination in society and politics. 
 
Furthermore, the model controls for life dissatisfaction, where personal unhappiness is strongly associated with less democratic 
satisfaction (-.32). This is an important control variable because scandals may be more frequently covered, dwelled-upon, and 
exaggerated where there is much general dissatisfaction. Poor political performance may give highly negative, mocking or 
disrespectful information about politicians a boost as popular campaign themes. If so, the bivariate scandal effect may be a 
compositional mirage due to the fact that scandals rise to prominence where there are many dissatisfied individuals. A similar 
rationale underpins the contextual unemployment level control; perhaps scandals figure as major political themes more often where 
the politr 
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While both variables affect the dependent variable it is satisfying that the scandal election effects remain also controlling for 
individual-level life satisfaction and contextual-level unemployment levels. 
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Model 4 also controls for the year in which elections were held. This is an important control for several reasons. First, the fact that 
bivariate results survive this control means they were not simply due to a spurious relationship with variables strongly related to time. 
Moreover, this control allows us to discover that also cumulative election history seems to matter. This negative coefficient has now 
grown to statistical significance because it was initially masked by a positive time trend in the data (.01). The trend is partly due to the 
fact that high-satisfaction countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria became EU (barometer) members at a late stage and that 
low-satisfaction countries such as Italy and Belgium were already in the data to begin with. While this “trend” is not very 
substantively interesting one needs to control for it in order to discover the moderately negative effect of number of past scandal 
elections (-.09) 
 
The last control variable concerns electoral systems and country size. It takes on the value 1 for France, Germany, the UK, and Italy. 
The results show that satisfaction with democracy has been somewhat lower in these countries throughout the period. The real reason 
for including the control, however, is that these countries had non-proportional (mixed or majoritarian) electoral systems for at least 
parts of the period. Perhaps incidentally, these are also the four largest and only G8 countries in the sample. Both electoral systems 
and size are relevant here as voters tend to be more susceptible to personal qualities of politicians in non-proportional systems and in 
large countries affecting world politics (Curtice and Holmberg 2005; Holmberg and Oscarsson forthcoming).  In such settings, a 
person- or even scandal-oriented culture—such as that often noted in France or Italy—may develop more easily. Interestingly, while 
these overlapping factors could well have confounded bivariate estimates Model 4 suggests they did not.  
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a one broad category, with no consideration of the variation within it. In this section, however, we examine differences between recent 
scandal elections with respect to trends and effects. This undertaking is interesting in itself, but also  
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two different versions of the scandal fatigue phenomenon. One is that scandal fatigue is driven by changes in the  
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composition of scandal elections. From this vantage point, a greater proportion of scandals today are of a character that does not (and 
never did) stimulate generalisations about politics. The second version of scandal fatigue is more genuinely contextual in that that a 
general scandalization of political communication has desensitized citizens to the extent that even scandal elections that once 
provoked generalisations have now lost their causal force. 
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We then looked at further differences among “unequivocal” scandal elections. For a second group of analyses, we counted scandal 
election traits that should theoretically  
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 smoothen the process of generalization and thus produce stronger effects. Theoretically, one would expect the generalization from 
specific events to general mistrust to become smoother where more politicians, perhaps from different parties, are accused of 
wrongdoings. For this purpose we have created two dummy variables that capture scandals that involve (1) more than one politician 
from a scandalized party (mult ipolitician party scandal), and (2) politicians from two or more parties (multiparty scandal). For the 
sake of comparison, a third dummy variable captures the residual category of more “ordinary” types of scandal elections involving 
alleged wrongdoings of individual politicians (individual politician scandal). To pick up nuances of the scandal fatigue phenomenon, 
we allow all three variables to interact with our measure of accumulated scandal experiences in respective country. According to our 
coding, 42 percent of all election scandals are classified as multipolitician, 22 percent as multiparty, and the remaining 36 percent as 
individual politician.  
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An election-level variable was coded 0 for scandal-free elections, 1 for ordinary scandal elections, and then adding a point for (a) 
scandal elections concerning more than one politician from a scandalized party, (b) old scandals that apparently are explosive enough 
to resurface during campaigns, (c) scandal elections concerning more than one party, and (d) scandal elections that involve alleged 
corruption, assuming that corruption is (perceived as) especially destructive for a whole range of democratic and societal outcomes, 
including cooperation, social and political trust, and economic growth (Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasiritousi 2009). 
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3 The resulting variable varies between 0 (scandal-free election) and 4 (reemerging, multi-politician/multi-party, corruption scandal 
elections). We then estimated an alternative version of Models 2 and 4 in Table 1, where scandal election variables registered this 
more fine-tuned variation. The results suggest that explanatory nuance is gained in that the difference between scandal-free election 
and very severe recent scandal election is -.20 (p=.000), as compared to the previously reported -.13 effect of any scandal election. In 
a further step, the scandal portion of the variable (1-4) was split as close to the median as possible, resulting in two dummies resulting 
tapping “less severe” and “more severe” scandal elections. The more severe half is significantly consequential for trust looking over 
the entire period (-.29; p=.000), whereas the impact of less severe scandal elections is close to zero. Interestingly, an interactive model 
suggests the initial impact of the former (-.39; p=.000) vanishes completely after roughly four unequivocal scandal elections (.11; 
p=.052).  
 
A third and final group of analyses looked closer at the number of politicians and actors simultaneously scandalized in one election 
context. Theoretically, one would expect the generalization from specific events to general mistrust to become smoother where more 
politicians, perhaps from different parties, are accused of wrongdoings. 
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 Justifying our approach 
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, results reported in Table 2 show that three categories of election scandals affect political trust differently. In accordance with 
expectation, e 
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lections with more than one scandalized party (“m 
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Three groups of analyses were performed. The first one exploits the fact that there are two expert sources. This provides an 
opportunity to compare scandal elections that are “unequivocal”—in the sense that both experts discuss scandals—with scandal 
elections that are less clear-cut and more uncertain in that only one expert does. To this end, alternative versions of the models in 
Table 1 were estimated (not shown in table). These included a dummy variable for “one-journal” scandal elections and another 
dummy for “two-journal” scandal elections. The results reveal that only two-journal scandal elections have significant effects looking 
at the entire period, but also that their impact has decreased. For instance, a model including main effects of both dummies, and their 
interactions with past scandal history, reveals estimates for the two-journal dummy that are very similar to those of Table 1. In 
contrast, the main effect of the one-journal dummy, as well as its interaction with previous scandal history, is virtually zero. 
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At this preliminary stage we have identified two subsets of scandals that might 
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This expectation is borne out in that e 
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Turning finally to election scandals involving single politicians 
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Elections in which several politicians from the same party are scandalized have only a non-significant negative effect (-.06; p=.288), 
whereas there is no effect whatsoever of one-party-single-politician scandal elections. Moreover, these differences remain intact, with 
wholly insignificant interactions with accumulating scandalization over time. Citizens appear as sensitive to multiparty scandal 
elections at the end of the period as they were from the outset.  
 
Sid. 25: [26] Borttaget Petesa 5/6/2009 2:36:00 PM 
However, a closer inspection of election-level data indicates that multiparty scandal elections is the only measured aspect that is 
uncorrelated with time (r=.03; n=115 elections). In contrast, one-party-single-politician scandal elections is the aspect that is most 
strongly correlated with time (r=.23).  
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are more equivocal, and  
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possess “severity” traits allowing 
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the scandalization of election  
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 for political trust (mainly individual politician scandals). In contrast, the frequency of severe scandal elections which have 
consistently affected trust has remained stable over time. When conceptualized as a general phenomenon, recent political scandals 
thus appear to gradually become less consequential. 
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 To substantiate this understanding of the process we have estimated how each type of election scandal correlates with time. In 
accordance with expectations, the correlation for individual politician scandal elections is quite strong  (r=.23, p < .01??, n=115 
elections), whereas multiparty scandal election is uncorrelated with time (r=.03; p < .XXX).  
The contextual process leading to scandal fatigue is more complex. As scandals accumulate in a particular country, citizens begin to 
adjust their evaluation of  scandals that involve alleged wrongdoings of individual politicians. While these scandals were originally 
inconsequential for trust in democracy – perhaps because the accused politician or his/her party suffered defeat at the ballot box – 
citizens gradually find that they might actually speak in favour of the functioning of democracy.  The precise reason why is unclear at 
this stage, but this finding is consistent with a process in which citizens acknowledge that journalists take an active role in the 
construction of a scandalous political context, and that there might be a reason to side with politicians in this apparent struggle for 
control of public deliberation. 
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On the one hand, we find support for the idea that types of scandal elections that used to be influential at lower levels of accumulated 
scandalization now no longer matter much. This is true for both more “unequivocal” as well as for more “severe” scandal elections. 
On the other hand, we find that multiparty scandal elections have greater negative trust effects than other scandal elections, but are 
influential at all levels of accumulated scandalization. These elections, however, have not become more important over time. Scandal 
fatigue, then, is probably best understood both as process in which citizens are desensitized to old scandal material, but also gradually 
exposed a new mix of such material that is found to be less informative concerning the functioning of democracy. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative number of scandal elections
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Table 2. Multilevel models of effects of different types of scandal elections on 
satisfaction with democracy (three levels; ML estimation) 
  
Model 1: 
 
 
Model 2: 
 
 
Model 3: 
 
Scandal election in one journal    
Scandal election in two journals    
    
Scandal severity index (0-5)    
    
Recent more severe scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals)    
Recent less severe scandal electionjk (0=scandal in no journal; 1=scandal in both journals)    
    
    
    
RANDOM PART:    
Individual level: Standard deviation of eijk    
Election level: Standard deviation of ujk    
Country level: Standard deviation of vk    
No. of countries    
No. of elections    
No. of individuals    
  
-2LogLikelihood 
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Sid. 43: [42] Borttaget stakum 5/5/2009 11:01:00 AM 
68,620 
 
Sid. 43: [42] Borttaget stakum 5/5/2009 10:47:00 AM 
68,620 
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*p<.10  ** p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Notes: Unweighted ata from The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. Parliamentary elections. All models contain 
intercepts and the same control variables as in Table 1, model 4, the estimates of which are not displayed. 
 
 
                                                
1 Particularly tTwo variables emphasized by the political trust literature—postmaterialist 
values and macroeconomic perceptions—are available but only for certain periods. We 
decided against using them as their inclusion would severely shorten the time frame, 
reduce the number of countries, and generally result in a data loss of one-third 
(postmaterialism) or more than half (economic evaluations). It should be noted, however, 
that some of their variation is picked up by the joint inclusion of age, year, and 
unemployment controls. Moreover, we decided against controlling for political 
orientations that are closely relatedconceptually close to  to satisfaction with democracy 
such as the strength of party attachment. Such orientations may constitute legitimate 
causal mechanisms for scandal election effects. While such mechanisms are interesting in 
themselves this paper is mainly concerned with the extent of, and explanations for, 
“total” scandal election effects. 
2 The macro data used for Model 4 were taken from the Quality of Government 
Institute’s Social Policy Data Set (Samanni, Teorell, Kumlin, and Rothstein 2008). In 
turn, this data set draws annual unemployment levels from OECD data as taken from the 
“Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006” (Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber, and 
                                                                                                                                               
Beyeler 2008), and growth levels from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) and “Penn 
World Table” (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). For electoral systems, we used 
information from Golder (2005). 
3 Multiparty scandal elections necessarily concern several individual politicians but such 
elections still only get one extra point along the index 
